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Abstract 
This article describes the new Tax Introduction Dataset (TID). Listing the year and the mode of the first 
permanent introduction of six major taxes (inheritance tax, personal income tax, corporate income tax, 
social security contributions, general sales tax and value added tax) in 220 countries, 1750-2018, TID is the 
most comprehensive dataset of its kind. The comprehensiveness of our measure is of critical value to 
empirical work on the causes of tax innovation and its consequences for state, society and economy. In this 
paper, we explain the selection of our tax sample and the structure of the dataset, descriptively map 
temporal and regional patterns of tax introductions around the world, and draw on TID to investigate 
associations between tax introductions and economic development, war, and democratization.   
Keywords: Taxation – Tax Introduction Dataset – Economic Development – War – Democratization 
1. Why TID? 
The modern state is a ‘tax state’ (Schumpeter 1917). Non-tax revenues are scarce. The availability of tax 
revenue crucially determines what a state can and cannot do, how many public goods and services it can 
deliver, how modestly or ambitiously it can define its policy goals, and how effectively it can impose its 
authority domestically and internationally (Besley and Persson 2011). Taxation, in turn, leaves its imprint on 
society. The level and structure of taxation determine who pays and who benefits, who owes and who 
deserves, who invests and who consumes. Taxes are at the heart of the social contract and constitute a 
core theme of political discourse and a core issue in distributive struggle. Tax states shape tax societies 
(Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad 2009).  
Virtually all states around the world rely on a small number of key taxes: taxes on income including the 
personal income tax (PIT), the corporate income tax (CIT) and social security contributions (SSCs); taxes on 
general consumption of either the general sales tax (GST) or the value-added tax (VAT) variety, and taxes 
on wealth, such as the inheritance tax (INH). While these key taxes are widespread, and account for roughly 
two-thirds of global tax revenue, the timing and sequence of their introduction vary significantly across 
countries. These differences are causally and symptomatically important. The introduction of a new tax is 
‘usually a quite public event’ (Levi 1989, 49), accompanied by a high degree of negotiation and 
contestation. It taps new revenue streams, changes the distributive bias of the tax system, and seals a new 
fiscal contract with potentially important downstream effects on state capacity, political institutions, and 
socio-economic structure: ‘how fiscal systems develop depends significantly on how they started’ (Zolt and 
Bird 2005, 24). Different starts may lead to different trajectories.  
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In this paper, we introduce a new global dataset that greatly enhances our ability to identify and map the 
timing of tax introductions, analyze their causes and explore their long-term consequences: the tax 
introduction dataset (TID). Covering the introduction of six taxes (INH, PIT, CIT, SSCs, GST and VAT) in 220 
countries between 1750 and 2018, TID helps to correct three prevalent biases in the fiscal literature. The 
first is a geographical bias in historical research to focus on the specific Western and to a lesser extent Latin 
American experience (see e.g. Peters 1991, Steinmo 1993, Centeno 2003, Aidt and Jensen 2009a, Dincecco 
and Katz 2016, Scheve and Stasavage 2016). Historically comparative tax data on non-Western countries, 
let alone colonies is difficult to get. This makes it difficult to set Western tax history into comparative 
perspective. Second is a recency bias of many large-N comparative analyses of taxation (see e.g. Cheibub 
1998, Kenny and Winer 2006,  Genschel and Seelkopf 2016, Bastiaens and Rudra 2016). While international 
organizations such as the IMF and the OECD now routinely provide comparative revenue data for large 
country samples, these data often go back only two or three decades. The same holds for the statutory tax 
rate or tax base data provided by international consultancies such as KPMG or PWC. Hence, a large-N 
design usually implies a fairly short period of observation. This makes it hard to put fit current findings into 
a historical perspective. Finally, there is a substantive bias in sociology, and political economy towards the 
PIT (and to a lesser extent the INH) as the hallmark of progressive taxation (see e.g. Ganghof 2006, Aidt and 
Jensen 2009b; Scheve and Stasavage 2012, Mares and Queralt 2015) and to the VAT as the quintessential 
tax on general consumption (see e.g. Kato 2003, Beramendi and Rueda 2007, Keen and Lockwood 2010). 
Much less attention is paid to the CIT, arguably the lynchpin of modern capital taxation, to SSCs even 
though they often raise more revenue than PIT, or to the GST, arguably the first modern tax on general 
consumption.  
In the following section 2, we briefly describe TID’s formal features. We explain its variables and data 
structure and compare it to other existing tax introduction datasets. In section 3, we discuss the main 
coding decisions behind TID. We explain why the dataset focuses on tax introductions rather than other 
indicators of fiscal development. We justify the selection of taxes covered (basically all main revenue 
sources of the modern tax state), and review issues of operationalization. In section 4, we use TID data to 
map the global diffusion of modern taxation. We find that virtually all states worldwide have, at one point 
in their history, adopted most or all of the six TID taxes. However, the timing and sequence of adoption 
varies markedly by tax, geographical region, and mode of introduction (sovereign, colonial or inherited). In 
section 5, we assess the ability of three standard explanations of fiscal policy change to account for 
differences in tax introductions: economic development, war, and democratization. All three are imbued by 
the historical experience of Western states. How well do they travel to the rest of the world? We find 
positive associations between tax introductions and all three factors. However, the pattern of association 
differs markedly between Western and non-Western countries: war is strongly associated with Western tax 
introductions but not with non-Western ones; democratization, by contrast, is associated with many tax 
introductions in non-Western but not in Western countries. Even if the taxes are the same in both country 
groups, the logic of their adoption seems to differ. Section 6 concludes by summarizing our main findings 
and suggesting avenues for further research.  
2. TID: variables and data structure  
In this section, we present the Tax Introduction Dataset (TID), and explain its main features: tax 




TID codes the year and the mode of the first permanent introduction at the national level of six major taxes: 
the personal income tax (PIT), the corporate income tax (CIT), social security contributions (SSCs), the 
inheritance tax (INH), the general sales tax (GST) and the value added tax (VAT). We focus on tax 
introductions at the national level because central government typically dominates domestic taxation, and 
also in order to ensure that data are comparable across countries. We focus on permanent introductions in 
order to exclude special cases of emergency finance, usually for wars (Aidt and Jensen 2009a).1  We 
distinguish three modes of tax introduction: sovereign (when an independent state introduces a tax), 
colonial (when a tax is introduced under colonial rule and maintained after independence) and inherited 
(when a tax is introduced in a state and then maintained in a new breakaway state after secession).  
Country coverage  
TID provides tax introduction information for 220 countries, past and present, of which 195 are still in 
existence today.2 The TID country list builds on the Correlates of War (COW) ‘State System Membership 
List’, 1816-2016 (Correlates of War Project 2017). Yet, TID frequently applies different country starting 
dates. This is because the COW criteria focus on the international legal recognition of a country’s 
independence, while the relevant issue for TID is domestic sovereignty (fiscal independence). COW includes 
all jurisdictions that have (or had) a population greater than 500,000 and had diplomatic missions with 
Britain and France (prior to 1920), and/or have been a member of the League of Nations or the United 
Nations or have received diplomatic missions from at least two major powers (after 1920).3 Yet, many 
countries achieved effective domestic, including fiscal, sovereignty before they achieved international legal 
recognition. Hungary, for instance, had effective fiscal sovereignty since the constitutional compromise of 
1867, even though it remained part of Austria-Hungary for international purposes until 1918. In other 
words, since 1867 Hungary was ‘at risk’ of introducing new taxes independently of Austria. TID thus treats 
Hungary’s SSC introduction in 1891 as a sovereign introduction.4 
Data Structure 
For each tax and country pair, TID provides three types of information.5 
 The status of tax introduction scored by three categories:  
o Introduced: at one point of the country’s history the tax was introduced at the national 
level on a permanent basis; 
o not introduced: at no point of the country’s history was the tax permanently introduced; 
o missing: information on the status of tax introduction is currently lacking. 
                                                            
1 Obviously, temporary emergency taxes may turn into permanent taxes. The relevant criteria for TID is the factual 
permanence of a tax. See the code book for further detail (Anonymous 2019). The codebook, the dataset as well as 
further supplementary material is available on the Review of International Organizations' webpage. Please visit 
www.anonymous.com for the most recent data version. 
2 25 countries no longer exist. They include historical states that have since been enveloped by larger states, such as 
the Republic of Vietnam or East Germany, as well as large historical states that have since fragmented, such as Great 
Colombia, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 
3 Note that small UN member states such as Andorra or Antigua and Barbuda are included in COW/TID even though 
they have populations substantially smaller than 500.000. This is important for tax research because many tax havens 
are very small (Genschel, Lierse, and Seelkopf 2016).  
4 For more information on the TID country list and its differences to the COW list, please consult the TID codebook 
(Anonymous 2019). 
5 In addition, we also collected information on the tax rate in the year of introduction as well as a dummy for 
subnational tax introduction: was the national introduction of a tax preceded by an introduction of the same tax at the 




 The calendar year of the first permanent introduction of the tax.  
 The mode of the first permanent introduction of the tax scored by six categories:  
o Sovereign: the tax was introduced by a fiscally sovereign national government;  
o Colonial: the tax was introduced under colonial rule and maintained by the country upon 
independence; 
o Inherited: the tax was introduced by a predecessor state and maintained by the country 
upon independence from that state; 
o Never introduced: the tax was never introduced;  
o Not applicable: the country could not have introduced a tax because it ceased to exist 
before this tax was conceived (most commonly applies with VAT);  
o Missing: no information on the mode of tax introduction is currently available. 
Each data entry is linked to a source and a comment section. Comments provide qualitative background 
information on the historical circumstances of tax introduction. Comments on missing cases contain a 
probability estimate of how likely the missing data reflect a case of never introduced. Given the chronic 
difficulties of proving non-events, many of TID’s missings are likely never introduced.6 Where appropriate 
the comments also discuss source conflicts. Source conflicts typically concern the demarcation between 
modern taxes (Is a new tax a GST or a VAT?) or between modern and pre-modern taxes (Does a new 
‘income tax’ qualify as a fully fledged PIT, and is therefore coded as PIT introduction, or not?). We discuss 
these coding problems further below (section 3).  
 Table 1: Overview of Tax Introduction Databases / Descriptions 
Authors Tax  Countries Time 
Webber and Wildavsky 
1986 
PIT Western World (16 countries) 1799 – 1909 
Aidt and Jensen 2009b PIT OECD (17 countries) 1815-1939 
Genovese, Scheve, and 
Stasavage 2016 
PIT OECD (20 countries) 1800 – 2010  
Brambor 2016 PIT World w/o Africa (39 / 50 
countries) 
1842-1975 / 
1842 – 1980 
Webber and Wildavsky 
1986 
INH Western World (9 countries) 1799 – 1909 
Plagge, Scheve, and 
Stasavage 2010 
INH OECD (18 countries) 1796 – 2009  
Brambor 2016 GST/VAT World w/o Africa (60 
countries) 
1864 – 2006 
International Tax 
Dialogue 2013 
VAT World (215 countries) 1961-2012 
                                                            
6 For further information on coding rules for missings and never introduced see the code book (Anonymous 2019). The 
current version of the dataset includes just around 4% (57 cases) of fully missing cases. For another 7% we know that 
the tax was introduced, but have no information on the mode and/or the year. For a very small minority of cases (10 
or 0.8%) we know the mode but not the year of introduction, implying that we have full information for 1169 or 88% 









TID is based on more than 1200 source documents. Wherever possible these documents are from official 
sources (legislative acts, and official reports from national governments and intergovernmental 
organizations). Other sources include reports by NGOs and private consultancies as well as the scholarly 
literature. The primary search method for documents is the desk-based online query.7 In addition, we rely 
extensively on interlibrary loans, the IMF’s online catalogue, material from the US Social Security 
Administration as well as archival sources at the British National Archives, the British Library, the French 
Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer, and the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. We started with a 
pre-study based on existing tax introduction data bases and some first coding (Anonymous). Yet, as table 1 
demonstrates, TID is by now far more comprehensive in terms of tax coverage, country coverage, and 
length of period of observation than any of these databases.  
3. Coding modern taxation 
Taxes are compulsory payments to the state ‘in exchange for nothing in particular’ (Martin, Mehrotra, and 
Prasad 2009). Tax payments do not create any concrete entitlements for the individual tax payer. Their 
primary purpose is to generate public revenue. Hence, revenue data is an obvious and commonly used 
measure in fiscal sociology and political economy (e.g. Lieberman 2002). Why then is it useful to construct a 
tax introduction database? Why code tax adoptions rather than tax income? Also, given the myriad of 
different taxes, past and present, how can any particular selection of taxes be justified? Why code the 
introduction of the six TID taxes rather than that of other taxes? We answer both questions in turn and 
close with a note on coding problems.   
Why code tax introductions? 
The permanent introduction of a tax is an important indicator for two main reasons. The first reason is 
substantive. Tax introduction is a necessary condition of tax revenue: without tax no tax collections. The 
adoption of a new tax gives the state access to new revenue streams, with potentially far-reaching 
consequences for state capacity, economic development, and distributive fairness (Besley and Persson 
2013, 57). It often marks a critical juncture in fiscal development, and a substantial change of the fiscal 
contract. Importantly, the introduction of a new tax matters even if it does not immediately result in more 
revenue because a new tax improves the state’s capacity to tax regardless of the extent to which this 
capacity is actually used. Revenue data, by contrast, conflate revenue outcomes with tax capacity 
(Andersson 2017). This is misleading because a state that raises a given revenue level with a couple of 
underused taxes clearly has a higher tax capacity than a state that raises the same level by using all 
available taxes to the tilt. The conflation of revenue and tax capacity is also misleading because revenues 
do not only reflect the policy choices of the government but also macroeconomic conditions beyond the 
government’s control.  
                                                            
7 For more information on our search strategy, see the Codebook (Anonymous 2019). 
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The second reason is pragmatic: tax introduction is comparatively easy to code. In an ideal world, of course, 
researchers would combine data on tax introduction, with revenue data as well as data on statutory rates, 
and base definitions. Yet, comparative time series data on revenues and statutory rates are sketchy or non-
existent for non-Western states. Even for Western states they are difficult to get for before 1950.8 
Sometimes only information on total tax revenues is available. Comparative time-series data on statutory 
tax bases are almost non-existent. Whenever fine-grained information on rates, revenues or bases is 
missing, data on tax introductions may help to proxy tax capacity and the tax mix (Andersson 2017, 4). 
Since tax introductions are easier to collect, they allow for a much broader coverage of countries, taxes and 
time periods.  
Which taxes to include? 
TID focuses on the introduction of six main taxes: PIT, CIT, SSCs, INH, GST and VAT. These taxes were 
selected because they embody three defining features of modern taxation that set them apart from pre-
modern forms of taxation: revenue capacity, administrative complexity and redistributive potential. 
Revenue capacity: All taxes, modern and pre-modern, ultimately fall on three broad macroeconomic tax 
bases: income, wealth, and consumption. Premodern taxes tapped into these bases selectively and by 
proxy (Kiser and Karceski 2017, 69). Income and wealth were targeted through taxes on people (forced 
labor, poll taxes, hut taxes, etc.), taxes on land and its produce (e.g. the tithe), taxes on features of real 
assets (e.g. the number of windows or chimneys), and stamp duties on legal transactions (e.g. marriage 
licenses, military commissions, land transactions, inheritance). Consumption was taxed selectively through 
trade taxes (at external borders), tolls (at internal borders) and excises on specific goods (salt, beer, 
matches, etc.). Modern taxes, by contrast, draw on the underlying macroeconomic tax bases immediately 
and comprehensively: PIT and CIT fall on personal and corporate income from virtually all sources; SSCs fall 
on all of wage income;9 INH falls on wealth of potentially all types; GST and VAT fall on all goods and 
services unless specifically exempted. Due to their broad base, modern taxes generate more revenue with 
less economic distortion than the old narrow based taxes they displaced. Due to their immediate link to the 
macroeconomic base, their revenue increases elastically with growth and fluctuates automatically with the 
business cycle without any need for tax rate adjustments or other legal changes (Peters 1991, 52). Revenue 
from pre-modern taxes, by contrast, is inelastic. It varies by physical factors of the tax environment 
(country size, length of the border, level of urbanization, etc.) more than by economic development and the 
business cycle. 
The revenue capacity of modern taxes enabled the emergence of big government as we know it today. 
Even developing countries have higher tax ratios today than the most developed Western states had before 
WWI. The six TID taxes contributed to this fiscal expansion in a major way. As table 2 (below) 
demonstrates, they account for roughly two-thirds of contemporary global tax receipts. To be sure, the 
revenue contribution of the INH is very small. However, it was an important revenue source during the 
takeoff phase of the Western tax state. The British INH, for instance, raised around 12 percent of total 
revenue in 1900 (Flora 1983, 339), i.e. about the share the CIT raises in the global median country today.  
                                                            
8 The Financing the State dataset covering 31 countries from the early nineteenth century is probably the best source 
available (Andersson and Brambor 2018).  
9 Sometimes, SSCs are charged on other forms of income as well. For instance, the SSC system adopted in Chile in 
1924 included mandatory contribution for self-employed persons with a weekly turnover of up to five thousand pesos 




Administrative complexity: The price of enhanced revenue capacity is administrative complexity. Pre-
modern taxes were administratively simple because they attached to easily observable proxies of the 
underlying macroeconomic tax base: Counting heads is administratively easier than assessing personal net-
income, surveying land is easier than measuring actual production, levying a stamp duty on wealth 
transactions is easier than valuating wealth, levying trade taxes at the border is easier than taxing 
consumption throughout the domestic economy. Modern taxes, by contrast, are information-intensive and 
logistically complicated. Their introduction is premised on, and in turn gives rise to, a large professionalized 
tax administration as well as to extensive record keeping requirements for taxpayers (Penndorf 1930). The 
introduction of the PIT and the CIT was associated with a drastic increase in ‘bureaucratic inquisition’ 
(Seligman 1914, 34–35), with new reporting duties for income earners, and, in many cases, new 
withholding duties for employers and financial intermediaries.10 The adoption of the GST and, even more 
so, the VAT, increased the record keeping requirements for small traders and businessmen, and implied 
extensive monitoring problems for the tax administration (Lynch 2013, 79–80). The introduction of the 
inheritance tax required the registration of the assets, rules on asset valuation, and the hiring of assessors 
to apply them (Davis 1992, 35). The introduction of SSCs spawned sprawling social security administrations 
(Peters 1991, 33).  
The link between modern taxation and state capacity is so close that the former often serves as a measure 
of the latter (e.g. Besley and Persson 2011, 6). Yet, the state’s ability to handle modern taxes depends not 
only on its own administrative capacities but also on citizens’ attitudes. Strong taxpayer resistance may 
make the introduction of modern taxes difficult even for high capacity states. Hence, the presence of 
broad-based modern taxes also indicates a high level of ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ on the part of citizens, 
a generalized willingness to cooperate with tax authorities without coercion (Levi 1989). Their adoption 
reflects the rise of the “infrastructural power” (Mann 1993, 59) of the modern state.  
Redistributive potential: Modern taxes offer governments more policy options for redistribution and socio-
economic management than pre-modern taxes. European pre-modern taxes were extremely regressive 
because they exempted the rich either de jure by granting special tax privileges for the nobility and the 
church, or de facto by failing to tap into the wealth and income of new industrial or financial elites. The 
introduction of progressive INH and PITs during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries redressed this 
balance by shifting a larger tax burden onto the rich (Scheve and Stasavage 2016, 10). Some have 
concluded that the main difference between pre-modern and modern taxation is regressivity versus 
progressivity (e.g. (Kiser and Karceski 2017, 80). Yet, modern taxes can also produce regressive effect, for 
instance, if a notionally progressive income tax is combined with home mortgage interest deductions and 
other perks to the well-to-do (Reid 2017, 88–89). The difference is rather that modern taxes give 
governments more levers to adjust the impact of taxation to its distributive preferences.  
Since they have a broader base than pre-modern taxes, modern taxes facilitate differentiating the 
(statutory) tax burden across classes, sectors and activities. Governments can fine tune tax progressivity 
through the adjustment of rate schedules and basic exemptions (PIT) or through income caps (SSCs)11 
(Peters 1991). They can reward cronies through targeted (CIT) incentives (Genschel, Lierse, and Seelkopf 
2016). They can support national growth models by shifting more of the tax burden onto domestic 
consumption (through the VAT) or on export sectors (through PIT, CIT and SSCs) (Haffert and Mertens 
                                                            
10 Withholding at source means that income tax is remitted by the payer of income rather than the income-recipient, 
i.e. the employer remits tax on behalf of its employees (before paying out net-wages), the bank remits tax on behalf of 
savers (before paying out net-interest earnings) (Slemrod 2007). 
11 Low income caps tend to increase the regressivity of SSCs, high caps tend to lower it (Ganghof 2007, 1075).  
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2017). They can use PIT deductions and exemptions for married couples and children as a social policy 
instrument (Peters 1991; Steinmo 2003). They can shape the structure of family capitalism through the INH 
treatment of productive capital. Importantly, given the broad base of modern taxes, governments can also 
use them to ‘level the playing field’ and to improve ‘market neutrality’ (Swank and Steinmo 2002). One 
major selling point of the VAT is its supposed tax neutrality (Charlet and Buydens 2012, 176).  
In short, by introducing modern taxes, governments enable themselves to implement widely varying rate 
levels and tax mixes so as to manipulate distributive and regulatory impacts (Hinrichs 1966; Steinmo 1993). 
The redistributive potential of pre-modern taxes is limited, by contrast. The narrowness of their tax bases 
makes tax neutrality all but impossible. The distribution of the tax burden is often an unintended byproduct 
of technical or administrative exigency, rather than of conscious policy choice. Early colonial tax systems, 
for example, were typically shaped by local geographies and indigenous responses more than by 
metropolitan ‘policy blueprint’ (Frankema and van Waijenburg 2014; Grafe and Irigoin 2006).  
We conclude with two disclaimers. First, we do not claim that the six TID taxes are the only modern taxes. A 
more comprehensive dataset would also include, inter alia, environmental taxes, property taxes and capital 
gains taxes. Second, we do not claim that contemporary taxation is completely modern. Some premodern 
taxes still exist and have fiscal significance, as, for instance, trade taxation in many developing countries. 
Coding problems  
While the conceptual differences between pre-modern and modern taxation are pronounced, real world 
taxes are often hybrids combining elements of both. In particular, early adopters often introduce peculiar 
mixtures of old and new that make it hard to decide whether a tax is already modern (and hence coded in 
TID) or still premodern (not coded). Take PIT. There are two basic systems (Genser and Reutter 2007). The 
comprehensive PIT applies uniformly to the total personal income of the taxpayer. Schedular PIT systems, 
by contrast, tax income from different sources (labor, capital, rent) separately under different rules and 
schedules. Conceptually, the comprehensive PIT is often considered superior in terms of neutrality (income 
from all sources treated equally for tax purposes) and equity (adjustment of the tax burden to the 
subjective ‘ability to pay’ of the taxpayer). Administratively, however, the schedular PIT is easier to operate. 
It often constitutes a first entry point into income taxation, and remains popular among developing 
countries with limited state capacity. Yet it is also common among developed countries aiming to reduce 
the PIT burden on internationally mobile capital without sacrificing PIT progressivity altogether. The Nordic 
‘Dual Income Tax’ is a prominent example (Ganghof 2006, 56).  
Coding only comprehensive income tax systems as PIT would greatly undervalue the prevalence of income 
taxation. Counting every tax on a separate income stream (dividends, interest, rent income, etc.) would 
grossly overvalue it. We therefore compromised by coding scheduler income taxes as a PIT if they provide 
for the coordinated taxation of at least two of the three major sources of personal income (capital, labor, 
land rent): coordinated in order to make sure the income tax system sought to tax according to the ‘ability 
to pay’ principle; two out of three in order not to be too restrictive as regards the administrative 
sophistication of revenue collection. Similar issues of classification occurred for instance with respect to the 
distinction between GST and VAT or between PIT and CIT. Our coding rules for resolving them are explained 
in the TID codebook (Anonymous 2019). 
The codebook also explains our decision to include SSCs in TID.  The status of SSCs is contested. Some argue 
that SSCs are not taxes because they are paid in exchange for individual welfare benefits – pensions, 
sickness insurance, or unemployment benefits. Others respond that the benefit level and the criteria of 
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entitlement are usually at the sole discretion of the government (Williams 1996, 6). In this view, SSCs are 
‘just another form of income taxation’ (Peters 1991, 237), and are treated as such by all relevant 
international tax statistics. The inclusion of SSCs in TID does not settle this debate but brings new evidence 
to bear on it. By offering comparative data on the introduction of SSCs and other main taxes, TID allows 
investigating across a large sample of countries whether SSCs follow a different political logic than other 
modern taxes. This could provide new impetus to classical research on “contribution-financed” and “tax-
financed” welfare regimes (see e.g. Titmuss 1958; Esping-Andersen 1990; Bonoli 1997).   
4. The global diffusion of modern taxation 
Based on TID data, we map global patterns of tax introductions, 1750-2018. Our findings challenge 
important ‘stylized facts’ in the literature, and suggest new questions for research. We start by surveying 
the status quo 2018: how many countries have introduced any of the six TID taxes in the past and still levy 
them today? Next, we plot the timing of the very first modern tax introduction in each country: which 
countries were frontrunners, which countries were latecomers? Third, we investigate sequences of tax 
introduction: which tax was first, and in what order did the others follow? Finally, we look into the mode of 
tax introduction: sovereign, colonial or inherited? 
Status Quo 
Table 2 surveys the current spread of the six TID taxes among the 195 currently existing countries in the TID 
sample. It lists how many of these countries have ever permanently introduced any of the six TID taxes in 
the past (based on TID data), and how many still levy these taxes today (based on other data). As the table 
shows, direct taxes on income are very common. More than 90 percent of the 195 countries levied a PIT, a 
CIT, and SSCs in 2017. Very few countries never introduced these taxes. Even fewer introduced them only 
to abolish them later. The VAT is slightly less prevalent (diffusion rate of 84 percent). Countries without a 
VAT mostly never introduced it in the first place. Iran is the only country to permanently introduce the VAT 
(in 2008) only to replace it again by a GST (in 2017).12 
Table 2: Taxation in 195 states, 2018 
  PIT CIT SSC INH GST VAT 
       
Median share of 
tax revenue worldwide (2010-2014) 14.1 12.2 17.8 0.4* 26.5 
States with tax in place  178 186 179 74 13 163 
      
States w/o tax in place  17 9 16 121 182 32 
of which 
a) introduced & abolished tax 5 3 10 55 131 1 
b) never introduced tax 11 6 3 35 47 31 
c) missing information 1 0 3 31 4 0 
                                                            
12 It is suggestive of the perceived success that an existing VAT has only ever been removed in six cases —Vietnam (in 
the 1970s), Grenada (introduced 1986, dismantled shortly thereafter), Ghana (introduced March 1995, removed two 
months later), Malta (introduced 1995, removed 1997), Belize (introduced 1996, removed 1999) and British Columbia 
(introduced 2010, removed 2011). However, in all cases, except for British Colombia, the tax has since been 
reintroduced: Ghana in 1998, Malta and Vietnam in 1999, Belize in 2006 and Grenada in 2010 (International Tax 
Dialogue 2013, 17; Financial Tribune 2017). 
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*OECD only. Sources: OECD 2017; ICTD/UNU-WIDER 2017 (revenue); PwC 2017 and Deloitte 2017 
(states with tax (not) in place), TID (tax introduction). 
 
INH and GST present a different picture. Only 38 percent of contemporary TID states levied an INH, and 
only 7 percent levied a GST in 2017. Some countries never introduced these taxes. More frequently, 
however, countries first introduced them and then abolished them again: of the 129 countries having 
introduced an INH in the past, only 74 retained it; and of the 144 that adopted a GST, 131 abolished it 
again. Both taxes are in decline. Yet, while the GST is usually replaced by a more efficient tax on general 
consumption, the VAT (Ganderson and Limberg 2017), the INH is simply abandoned with no new wealth tax 
emerging in lieu. Given vocal concerns about rising wealth inequality (e.g. Piketty and Saez 2014), the 
uncompensated erosion of the INH is remarkable.  Whether this is due to tax competition (Genschel and 
Schwarz 2011; Brülhart and Parchet 2014), the spread of “neoliberal tax policy ideas” (Steinmo 2003; 
Swank 2006; Rixen 2011), democracy failure (Bartels 2005) or other factors is an interesting question for 
future study. 
In sum, modern taxation is not a specifically Western phenomenon. Most countries worldwide have 
introduced all six TID taxes. Non-introductions are rare, and mostly limited to oil-producing states such as 
the United Arab Emirates (never introduced PIT, CIT, SSCs, INH or GST) and Kuwait (never introduced PIT, 
INH, GST, or VAT), and to small tax havens such as Vanuatu (never introduced PIT, CIT or INH) and the 
Marshall Islands (never introduced CIT, GST or VAT).  
Timing  
Figure 1 gives a rough overview of the timing of the introduction of the first modern tax. It shows that only 
one quarter of countries worldwide had adopted at least one TID tax before the end of the nineteenth 
century. All other countries only started the transition to modern taxation in the twentieth century. The 
quartile of early adopters (colored in black) includes the usual suspects from Western Europe (the UK, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Scandinavian countries) but excludes the United States. It also 
includes Russia, Japan, most of Latin America, and former British India (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). 
Figure 1 around here 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the rate of tax introductions accelerated.13 While the first quartile 
had taken almost one and a half centuries to introduce their first modern tax (1750s to 1890s), the second 
quartile (dark grey) took only roughly forty years (1890s to early-1930s). It includes the United States and 
Canada, but also, perhaps more surprisingly, large parts of colonial Asia and Africa as well as pre-
revolutionary China. After the 1930s the rate of introductions accelerated even further. The third quartile 
(light grey) of countries only took roughly 25 years to introduce their first modern tax (early-1930s to early-
1950s). It consists mostly of African and Asian countries. The latecomers (very light grey), introducing their 
first modern tax after the mid-1950s consist mostly of newly founded countries that emerged after the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1990s. 
In sum, modern taxation has a longer history in non-Western countries than the European focus of much of 
fiscal sociology and comparative political economy may suggest (Seligman 1914; Hinrichs 1966; Webber 
and Wildavsky 1986; Peters 1991; Aidt and Jensen 2009b; Mares and Queralt 2015). Not all Western 
                                                            
13 Is the differences in diffusion speed ‘real’ or is it driven by changes in the composition of the country sample (i.e. by 
a secular increase in the number of tax jurisdictions)? We address this question below.  
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countries were among the frontrunners of modern taxation and not all non-Western countries were 




Figure 2 compares temporal patterns of tax diffusion across different tax types. It suggests a clear 
chronological order: the inheritance tax was the first modern tax to spread widely.14 By the early twentieth 
century, more than sixty countries had introduced it. VAT is the youngest tax. The median country adopted 
it only in the 1990s. The other taxes cluster in between, with the median introduction occurring either just 
before (PIT) or slightly after (CIT, SSC, GST) 1950. The figure also suggests considerable variance in the 
speed of tax diffusion. The spread of the inheritance tax was comparatively slow. It took over a century 
until half of the countries in our sample had adopted it. VAT diffusion was comparatively rapid. Only slightly 
over 20 years on from its initial introduction, half the countries in our sample had adopted it.  
Note, however, that the differences in diffusion speed may reflect historical change in the composition of 
the country sample rather than ‘real’ differences in rate of diffusion. To disentangle these effects, we would 
need a time-series-cross-section dataset of countries, both independent and colonial, at risk of tax 
introduction in any given year, 1750-2018. Such a dataset does not currently exist and would require 
considerable effort to construct.15 It is well known, of course, that the number of independent states has 
increased dramatically over the past 100 years (Correlates of War Project 2017; Alesina and Spolaore 1997). 
Yet, a large number of newly independent states were former colonies. Hence, by including colonial tax 
introductions, TID attenuates one important source of historical variation in the country sample. Still, 
jurisdictional change after decolonization may bias our results. For instance, the apparent slowness of INH 
diffusion may simply reflect the very late entry of Post-Communist countries into the risk set. We checked 
this possibility by recalculating figure 2’s INH boxplot without the 27 Post-Communist states that gained 
independence after 1990. The result remains essentially unchanged. Obviously, this is not conclusive proof 
that the slow diffusion rate is real. But it warns against excluding that possibility lightly.  
Figure 2 around here 
While Figure 2 suggests a standard sequence of tax introductions, starting with the INH and ending with the 
VAT, closer inspection reveals that only two countries follow this exact pattern (Colombia and Sweden). All 
others introduced their taxes in different orders. For the 110 countries in our sample for which full 
information on all six taxes is available, we observe 76 different sequences of tax introductions. Even 
among classical Western tax states, there is little uniformity, as the following examples demonstrate:  
 France: INH- PIT-GST-SSC-CIT-VAT (1798-1914-1920-1928-1948-1968) 
 Germany: SSC-INH-GST-PIT-CIT-VAT (1883-1906-1918-1920-1920-1968) 
 UK: INH-PIT-SSC-GST-CIT-VAT (1796-1842-1911-1940-1965-1973) 
                                                            
14 Note, however, that the first modern tax ever to be introduced was a SSC: In 1758 the German principality of Baden, 
an independent state until German unification in 1871, introduced a contribution-based survivor pension system for 
its civil servants. 
15We have searched quite extensively for such a dataset, but could not find a solution. Building such a dataset 
ourselves would require at least as much effort to create than TID. Hence, we decided to rely on the COW state list, 
one of the most commonly used political science databases, and extend it wherever necessary (see Codebook 2019).   
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 US: CIT-PIT-INH-SSC (1909-1913-1916-1935; no federal GST or VAT) 
In sum, while the adoption of the six TID taxes is standard around the world, there is no standard sequence 
of adoption. Trajectories differ widely across countries and regions. This is surprising given historical 
accounts emphasizing common developmental pathways in modern taxation (e.g. Steinmo 1993, chap. 2; 
Peters 1991, chap. 7; Hinrichs 1966). It is also surprising in light of the literature on policy diffusion 
emphasizing the contagiousness of tax innovation (Swank 2006; Appel and Orenstein 2013). If taxes spread 
in transnational waves, this should synchronize the timing and sequence of introductions across countries. 
Yet, this is not obvious from our preliminary evidence. Perhaps cross-national differences in economic 
development, political democratization or bellicosity blunt the harmonizing influences. We come back to 
this issue in section 5 below.  
Mode of tax introduction 
Figure 3 compares tax introductions by mode. While most countries adopted modern taxes by independent 
decision (sovereign), others simply continued to levy the taxes that former colonial rulers had imposed on 
them before independence (colonial) or that they inherited from their predecessor state (inherited). For 
instance, India and Pakistan kept the PIT that had been introduced by their former British masters 
(colonial); Azerbaijan and Belarus inherited their SSC system from the Soviet Union (inherited). As 
Lieberman (2002) suggests, colonial introductions of PIT and other direct taxes are very common. Colonial 
introductions of GSTs are rare, and in no case was the VAT introduced during colonial times. Inherited 
introductions are mostly limited to SSCs. This finding is driven primarily by the Soviet Union which 
introduced SSCs in 1990 and bequeathed them on its multiple descendant states. 
Figure 3 around here 
While virtually the entire tax literature in political economy and fiscal sociology focuses on the tax policy of 
sovereign states, a sizeable share of modern taxes were introduced under colonial rule or, less frequently, 
under the rule of a predecessor state. Even economic historians contribute little to analyzing the causes 
and conditions of such non-sovereign introductions. To the extent they deal with these issues at all, they 
tend to focus on pre-modern colonial taxation, from forced labor to hut taxes and trade taxation (Frankema 
and van Waijenburg 2014; Grafe and Irigoin 2006; Yun-Casalilla 2012). Modern forms of taxation are mostly 
ignored (but see Gardner 2012). Yet, colonial tax modernization constitutes a potentially interesting field of 
study. Why, for instance, did British colonies introduce the CIT so much earlier than Britain itself?16 What 
are the consequences of colonial introduction? Does it facilitate or hinder fiscal modernization and 
development after independence?  
In conclusion, our preliminary survey of the TID data yields some important insights. First, wide differences 
in social, political, and economic conditions notwithstanding almost all countries worldwide have 
introduced all TID taxes. PIT, CIT, SSC, GST/VAT and to a lesser extent INH are truly global taxes. Second, the 
timing and sequence of tax introductions vary widely not only between country groups but also within 
them. Western countries are not always the frontrunners of tax modernization; the rest of the world is not 
always trailing behind. Third, non-sovereign tax introductions are common. Newly independent states 
regularly carry on with the old taxes inherited from colonial rule or a predecessor state. 
                                                            
16 British India introduced the CIT already in 1886, Britain only in 1965. 
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5.  The correlates of tax introduction  
How can differences in the timing and sequence of tax introductions be explained? Three potential drivers 
of fiscal development have attracted particular attention in the literature: economic development, war, and 
democratization (e.g. Kenny and Winer 2006; Kiser and Karceski 2017; Genschel and Seelkopf 2016; 
Steinmo 1993; Kato 2003; Scheve and Stasavage 2016). We discuss theoretically how these factors may fuel 
the introduction of modern taxes, and explore empirically how tightly they are associated to tax 
introductions across different taxes and world regions.  
Theories of fiscal development  
Economic development, war, and democratization are associated with three broad theories of fiscal 
development: modernization theory (Wagner and Weber 1977; Hinrichs 1966), bellicist theories of state 
building (Hintze 1906; Tilly 1990; Scheve and Stasavage 2016) and (positive) theories of democracy (Boix 
2003; Levi 1989; Peters 1991). While none of these theories is a theory of tax introduction, all of them 
provide arguments why there may be increasing demand for, or a growing supply of modern taxes. We 
briefly review them in turn.  
Economic development: According to the 19th century German economist Adolph Wagner public revenue 
ratios grow with economic development (Wagner’s law): as societies get richer, states can and must tax 
more (e.g. Kiser and Karceski 2017; Wagner and Weber 1977). They can tax more because their taxable 
surplus is higher: the economy presents more income streams, wealth and consumption activities that can 
be taxed after the basic needs of the population are taken care of (Hinrichs 1966, 8; Webber and Wildavsky 
1986, 333); the society is highly monetized, formalized, industrialized and urbanized; the public 
bureaucracy is better endowed, better staffed, and generally more capable to handle complicated modern 
taxes than in poor countries (Besley and Persson 2013, 78–79; Dincecco and Katz 2016). At the same time, 
rich societies must tax more because their wealth facilitates political mobilization for more public goods 
and for more public redistribution (Hinrichs 1966, 8), and because Baumol’s cost disease increases spending 
requirements (Baumol 1993).17 In short then, economic development may fuel the introduction of modern 
taxes by increasing a country’s need for revenue capacity and redistributive potential and by improving its 
capacity to cope with administrative complexity.  
War: It is almost a truism in fiscal sociology that war is “the usual reason for imposing new taxes and 
increasing old ones” (Spencer 1898, 567; see also Tilly 1990; Hintze 1906; Dincecco, Federico, and Vindigni 
2011; Scheve and Stasavage 2010). This is because wars are expensive, and governments usually need extra 
revenue to fund them (Peters 1991, 232; Dincecco and Prado 2012; Gennaioli and Voth 2015; Kiser and 
Linton 2001; Zielinski 2016). It is also because wars create inequities that need to be compensated through 
taxation. Thus, allegedly, the ‘universal conscription’ of young men during WWI led to political demands for 
a compensatory ‘conscription of [old] wealth’, which in turn ushered in a turn towards progressive taxation, 
including the PIT, CIT and INH (Scheve and Stasavage 2016). Finally, war create powerful incentives for 
administrative capacity building (Besley and Persson 2009, 1218; Tilly 1990, 75; Dincecco and Prado 2012; 
Besley and Persson 2011; Ardant 1975; Brewer 1990; Hoffman 1994). This capacity, in turn, facilitates tax 
administration and allows for the introduction of more complicated taxes. In short, war creates demand for 
                                                            
17 In a nutshell, the cost diseases argument goes like this: government is labor-intensive; labor-intensive industries 
tend to have lower productivity gains than more capital-intensive businesses; as a consequence, the government has 
to spend more on the provision of labor-intensive public services in order to keep the ratio of these services constant 
with the rising output of income and wealth by the more capital-intensive private sector. 
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revenue capacity and redistributive potential and, in turn, facilitates coping with administrative complexity. 
In all these ways it increases the likelihood of modern tax introductions. 
 Democratization: There is considerable debate in political science about the effects of regime type on 
taxation. Some argue that democracy and the extension of the suffrage facilitate higher and more 
progressive taxation (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). Others contend that non-democracies tend 
to introduce progressive income taxes earlier than democracies (Mares and Queralt 2015), or claim that 
regime type is largely irrelevant for tax progressivity (Scheve and Stasavage 2010). The debate focuses on 
two mechanisms. First, according to the median voter theorem, the extension of the franchise to lower 
classes fuels political demand for bigger and more redistributive government (Meltzer and Richard 1981). 
This could imply that democratization brings the introduction of new, revenue-efficient and progressive 
taxes in its wake (Peters 1991, 231; McCarty and Pontusson 2011). It could also imply, however, that 
autocracies adopt new redistributive sources of revenue so as to preempt democratization (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2001, 2000; see also Boix 2003; Borge and Rattsø 2004; Gouveia and Masia 1998). The empirical 
implications are thus ambiguous. Second, to the extent the extension of the suffrage increases the ‘quasi-
voluntary compliance’ of citizens and taxpayers (Levi 1989), it may indirectly improve the state’s capacity to 
handle complex taxes (Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1993; Tilly 1990; Wahl, Kastlunger, and Kirchler 2010). This 
effect should unambiguously increase the capacity of democracies to introduce modern taxes. 
Correlational evidence  
What is the evidence? Are economic development, war, and democratization to the introduction of 
modern taxes empirically? To find out, we run a series of event history analyses of tax introductions for 
each of the six TID taxes. Unfortunately, our data on the covariates is limited. Therefore we have to limit 
our analysis to sovereign introductions. For the same reason, the period of analysis is restricted to 1816-
2015.  
We assess the likelihood of sovereign tax introductions with probit models using a maximum likelihood 
estimation. Once a specific tax is invented, countries are at risk of introducing it.18 Countries gaining 
independence after this date enter the risk set with the year of their independence. Once a country has 
introduced a tax, it drops out of the sample for that specific tax. As to our explanatory variables, we proxy 
economic development by GDP per capita (ln values) based on data by Gapminder (2015).19 Warfare is 
measured by a dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ when a country faces a major interstate war (+/- 5 
years) (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).20 Finally, we include a democratization dummy indicating whether or 
not a country has introduced male suffrage recently (+/- 5 years). Data come from Przeworski et al. (2013). 
To model the temporal dimension of our data (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998), we use a cubic polynomial 
approximation as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010). We include region fixed effects to account for 
unobserved spatial heterogeneity. For each tax (but VAT), we estimate three models (see figure 4 and 
tables 3 – 8 in the appendix): one for all independent TID countries, one for a subsample of key Western 
                                                            
18 We define the risk-of-introduction year of a tax as 10 years prior to its first introduction worldwide. As a 
consequence, the analysis of the following three taxes does not start 1816 but at a later date: CIT (1863-2015), GST 
(1894-2015), VAT (1957-2015). PIT, INH and SSCs already existed by 1816. 
19 Gapminder merges data from various sources to arrive at a comprehensive dataset that covers both colonies and 
independent states from 1800 until today. More information on the variable creation can be found here: 
https://www.gapminder.org/data/documentation/gd001/ 
20 We follow the convention in the literature and count conflicts with more than 1000 battle death as major wars. As a 
robustness check, we also include a dummy that takes on the value 1 for conflict years and observations 10 years 
before/after a conflict took place. 
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countries (‘OECD-18’)21, and one for the ‘rest of the world’ (RoW).22 For VAT we only calculate two models 
(all countries and RoW) because hardly any OECD-18 country experienced war and democratization during 
the historical period of VAT diffusion. We also run a series of robustness checks. Since they do not 
substantially change the findings presented below, we relegate them to the appendix (see tables 9-45 and 
figures 5-10).   
Figure 4 around here 
Figure 4 plots the average marginal effects of our models. The graphs show that neither economic 
development, nor war, nor democratization is significantly associated with tax introduction all the time. 
There is nothing to suggest that any of them is a necessary condition for tax introduction. As the plots also 
show, however, each factor is significantly and positively associated with tax introductions some of the 
time. In no case is economic development, war or democratization related to a significantly lower likelihood 
of tax adoption. This is compatible with the view that all three factors are conditionally effective causes of 
tax introduction.  
One condition shaping the pattern of association is the type of tax to be introduced. As figure 4 shows, 
factors that are associated with the introduction of one tax often are not associated with the introduction 
of other taxes. For instance, economic development is related to the introduction of income taxes (SSCs, 
CIT, and to a lesser extent PIT) but not to INH introductions. Democratization matters for VAT but not for 
GST introductions even though both taxes fall on the same macroeconomic tax base.  
Even more pronounced are variations by country group: factors related to the introduction of a specific tax 
in OECD-18 countries tend not to be related to the introduction of the same tax in RoW countries and vice 
versa.23 Thus, war is an important covariate of tax introductions in OECD-18 countries. It is associated not 
only with INH and PIT introductions as routinely highlighted in the literature (Scheve and Stasavage 2010, 
2012, 2016; Mares and Queralt 2015) but also with GST adoptions, as, for instance, in France, where the 
most important legacy of WWI was not the progressive PIT but the invention of the turnover tax (Lynch 
2013). In RoW countries, by contrast, war is associated with the introduction of one tax only, the INH. 
Democratization presents the mirror image. Here the association is strong for RoW countries but not in 
OECD-18 countries. In the former country group, democracy is related to the introduction of four taxes 
(INH, PIT, CIT, VAT). In the latter, it matters only for the introduction of INH.  
The differences between the two country groups are important because they warn against assuming lightly 
that fiscal developments in non-Western countries will follow the trodden Western path. Rather, the close 
association between the ‘all countries’ and the RoW effects in figure 4 (and the dissociation between the 
‘all countries’ and the OECD-18 effects) suggests that there are different logics at work in both country 
groups. The Western experience seems to be an outlying case rather than a standard mode. This qualifies 
ongoing debates in important ways. For instance, a lot of attention has been devoted to the puzzling non-
effect of democratisation on PIT introduction in Western countries (Aidt and Jensen 2009b; Mares and 
Queralt 2015; Scheve and Stasavage 2016). Yet, figure 4 suggests that this is a rather OECD-specific puzzle. 
Globally, the correlation between democratization and PIT is quite pronounced.  
                                                            
21 These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
22 RoW includes all sovereign countries, for which data is available, minus the OECD-18.  
23 There are only three exceptional cases, in which the same factor is associated with the same tax introduction in 
both country groups. These are modernization in the case of SSC introduction, as well as war and democratization in 
the case of INH introduction.  
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Other conditions potentially shaping tax introductions are not apparent from figure 4 but can be analysed 
with TID data. One is historical timing. Closer inspection of the data reveals, for instance (see figure 5 in the 
appendix), that the association between democratization and VAT introduction (see lower right plot in 
figure 4 for the aggregate effect) varies over time. In the early years of VAT diffusion (the 1970s and 1980s) 
it is virtually absent. It only emerges in the 1990s when a host of formerly communist countries transition 
to democracy and introduce the VAT both essentially at the same time. Re-running the two VAT models 
plotted in figure 4 while excluding 27 ex-Communist countries from the sample, completely vitiates the 
democratization effect (see figure 6 in the appendix).  
In conclusion, the effects of economic development, war and democratization on sovereign tax 
introduction vary by tax, by country group, and by time period. This warns against generalizing lightly from 
the experience of one particular world region (the West) to other regions, from the analysis of one 
particular tax (the PIT or the VAT) to other taxes, or from the recent past to the more distant past, and vice 
versa. Arguably, the effects of development, war and democratization also vary between sovereign and 
colonial tax introductions. Yet, this is an issue for further research. 
6. Findings and implications  
In this paper we presented the ‘Tax Introduction Dataset’ (TID). TID provides comparative data on the year 
and mode of the first permanent introduction of six major taxes (INH, PIT, CIT, SSCs, GST, VAT) in 220 
countries, 1750-2018. As our exploration of the data has shown, the six taxes have spread globally. Virtually 
all states worldwide have adopted them, with the notable exception of oil-producing countries and tax 
havens. Tax introductions are sticky: once adopted, taxes tend to remain in force. Repeals are rare, except 
for the INH, which has recently undergone a wave of abolitions, and for the GST which has been succeeded 
by the VAT since the 1970s. The mode, timing and sequence of tax introductions vary widely. While most 
taxes in the TID sample were introduced by independent states (sovereign), others were imposed by 
colonial rulers (colonial) or inherited from predecessor states (inherited). We found more than 70 different 
introduction sequences of the six taxes. We also found that economic development, war, and 
democratization are important correlates of tax introduction but that the pattern of correlation varies over 
time, over taxes, and over countries.   
Our preliminary analyses of TID have highlighted various ways in which this new data source can help 
improve previous research. First, TID covers a larger country sample than any other tax introduction 
dataset. This allows correcting the implicit Western bias in much of the existing literature. Our event history 
analyses suggest, for instance, that important causal explanations derived from Western experience may 
not travel easily to other world regions. While we found economic development to be fairly equally 
associated with sovereign tax introductions in Western and non-Western countries, there were marked 
differences with respect to war and democratization. On the one hand, major inter-state war was more 
pervasive among Western states than among non-Western states, and, consequently, is more strongly 
associated with tax innovations in these states. On the other hand, Western autocracies were at the 
forefront of tax innovation during the nineteenth century (Aidt and Jensen 2009b; Mares and Queralt 
2015), yet democratization seems to be an important driver of tax innovation outside the West. Obviously, 
TID’s large country sample also allows for more fine grained analyses of regional and country differences. 




Second, TID’s broad tax sample allows for a comparison of the causes of tax introduction across different 
taxes thus correcting for a substantive bias in the literature towards the PIT and the VAT. Our preliminary 
inspection of the data reveals both similarities and differences across taxes. On the one hand, for instance, 
colonial introductions of direct taxes (PIT, CIT, SSCs, INH) are common while colonial introductions of 
indirect taxes (GST) are uncommon. On the other hand, PIT and GST are almost equally popular 
instruments of Western war finance. TID’s broad tax coverage also brings two often neglected but fiscally 
important taxes into the analysis, SSCs and GST.  
Third, TID’s long period of observation (more than 250 years) allows for the study of period effects on tax 
introduction over the very long term. Arguably, the effects of economic development, warfare, and 
democratization on tax introductions vary over time. Factors that are associated with tax introductions in 
the nineteenth century are not necessarily also associated with twenty-first century introductions. TID 
allows investigating what travels and what does not travel over time and hence what we can learn from the 
past for future tax introductions. 
Finally, and beyond the analyses offered in this paper, TID lends itself to investigating not only the causes of 
tax introductions but also their consequences. Previous research has suggested, for instance, that the 
circumstances of tax introduction shape long-run fiscal outcomes. Thus, purportedly, PITs are more 
buoyant when initially introduced under democracy than under autocracy (Brambor 2016). TID allows 
studying also other legacy effects, including the long run effects of colonial tax introductions on post-
colonial revenue, state capacity and growth, or the effect of pre-communist tax introductions on post-
communist states and societies. Does it make a difference that Kenya inherited its PIT from colonial times 
while Ethiopia introduced it on its own? Does it matter for Romanian tax policy after 1990 that Romania 
already had a range of modern taxes (including INH, SSCs, PIT and GST) before communism?  Taxation is a 
key to understanding the modern state. TID offers an important new key to understanding taxation.  
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Main Regression Results 
 
Table 3: Regression Results INH 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0626 -0.4481 0.0791 
 
(0.0743) (0.5572) (0.0788) 
War 0.4079*** 1.0912** 0.4006** 
 
(0.1514) (0.4766) (0.1774) 
Democratization 0.3892** 0.9767** 0.4891** 
 
(0.1816) (0.4699) (0.2078) 
t -0.0306* -0.1268*** -0.0157 
 
(0.0163) (0.0479) (0.0206) 
t2 0.0008** 0.0027** 0.0004 
 
(0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0005) 
t3 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 430.0367 102.8725 328.2512 
Log Likelihood -202.0184 -42.4362 -151.1256 
Deviance 404.0367 84.8725 302.2512 
Num. obs. 3117 654 2463 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
Table 4: Regression Results SSC 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.3477*** 0.8933*** 0.3265*** 
 
(0.0550) (0.3122) (0.0570) 
War 0.0529 -0.2579 0.0899 
 
(0.1224) (0.3069) (0.1396) 
Democratization 0.1058 0.2094 0.1134 
 
(0.1380) (0.4768) (0.1476) 
t 0.0008 -0.0375 0.0086 
 
(0.0115) (0.0372) (0.0125) 
t2 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0003 
 
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
t3 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 851.3427 158.1392 696.4183 
Log Likelihood -412.6713 -70.0696 -335.2091 
Deviance 825.3427 140.1392 670.4183 
Num. obs. 4748 1411 3337 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
Table 5: Regression Results PIT 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
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Modernization 0.1865** 0.1828 0.2170** 
 
(0.0749) (0.2906) (0.0851) 
War 0.2240* 0.7321*** -0.1136 
 
(0.1350) (0.2639) (0.1842) 
Democratization 0.4452*** -0.1586 0.3771** 
 
(0.1448) (0.5095) (0.1756) 
t -0.0347*** 0.0456 -0.0338** 
 
(0.0126) (0.0562) (0.0151) 
t2 0.0007*** -0.0007 0.0007** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 612.7534 146.3619 449.4140 
Log Likelihood -293.3767 -64.1810 -212.7070 
Deviance 586.7534 128.3619 425.4140 
Num. obs. 3789 1223 2566 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
Table 6: Regression Results CIT 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.3338*** 0.4604* 0.3125*** 
 
(0.0740) (0.2517) (0.0802) 
War -0.1465 -0.1418 -0.1568 
 
(0.1494) (0.2611) (0.1944) 
Democratization 0.4557*** -0.2633 0.5263*** 
 
(0.1308) (0.3986) (0.1547) 
t -0.0329*** 0.0484 -0.0336** 
 
(0.0117) (0.0482) (0.0137) 
t2 0.0007*** -0.0005 0.0007** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 763.9873 171.3784 592.1917 
Log Likelihood -368.9936 -76.6892 -284.0958 
Deviance 737.9873 153.3784 568.1917 
Num. obs. 4166 1116 3050 







Table 7: Regression Results GST 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 




(0.0494) (0.3704) (0.0515) 
War 0.1158 1.3132*** 0.0262 
 
(0.1251) (0.3742) (0.1545) 
Democratization 0.1217 -0.3829 0.1105 
 
(0.1208) (0.4192) (0.1352) 
t 0.0014 1.1417*** 0.0015 
 
(0.0120) (0.3440) (0.0131) 
t2 0.0002 -0.0271*** 0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0082) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
AIC 1000.2684 122.6117 836.9500 
Log Likelihood -487.1342 -52.3058 -405.4750 
Deviance 974.2684 104.6117 810.9500 
Num. obs. 5166 921 4245 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
Table 8: Regression Results VAT 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0152 -0.0670 0.0077 
 
(0.0484) (0.4143) (0.0507) 
War -0.2653 28.3676 -0.2591 
 
(0.1909) (1340.3502) (0.1922) 
Democratization 0.7190*** -4.9144 0.7485*** 
 
(0.1598) (1901.5120) (0.1743) 
t -0.0253 0.9000*** -0.0426 
 
(0.0263) (0.3293) (0.0287) 
t2 0.0032*** -0.0433*** 0.0040*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0156) (0.0012) 
t3 -0.0000*** 0.0006*** -0.0001*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
AIC 1227.8436 128.1544 1093.9261 
Log Likelihood -600.9218 -55.0772 -533.9630 
Deviance 1201.8436 110.1544 1067.9261 
Num. obs. 5380 415 4965 














Table 9: Regression Results VAT: Variation over Time 
 
<=1980 <=1990 <=2000 <=2010 <2020 
Modernization 0.2641* 0.0754 0.0330 0.0148 0.0152 
 
(0.1385) (0.0872) (0.0571) (0.0498) (0.0484) 
War 0.1004 -0.2765 -0.3078 -0.2703 -0.2653 
 
(0.3192) (0.2822) (0.2093) (0.1913) (0.1909) 
Democratization -0.0291 0.0395 0.8524*** 0.7260*** 0.7190*** 
 
(0.4832) (0.4541) (0.1681) (0.1607) (0.1598) 
t 0.7575 0.5223** 0.0037 -0.0254 -0.0253 
 
(0.8377) (0.2102) (0.0382) (0.0288) (0.0263) 
t2 -0.0305 -0.0234** 0.0015 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 
 
(0.0536) (0.0105) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
t3 0.0003 0.0003** -0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 259.1481 455.8186 969.8542 1179.7366 1227.8436 
Log Likelihood -116.5741 -214.9093 -471.9271 -576.8683 -600.9218 
Deviance 233.1481 429.8186 943.8542 1153.7366 1201.8436 
Num. obs. 2713 3873 4746 5229 5380 





Robustness I: Without Post-Communist Countries 
 





Table 10: Regression Results INH Without Post-Communist Countries 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0588 -0.4481 0.0570 
 
(0.0763) (0.5572) (0.0804) 
War 0.3908** 1.0912** 0.3270* 
 
(0.1616) (0.4766) (0.1921) 
Democratization 0.4484** 0.9767** 0.4626** 
 
(0.1912) (0.4699) (0.2242) 
t -0.0307* -0.1268*** -0.0083 
 
(0.0162) (0.0479) (0.0217) 
t2 0.0007** 0.0027** 0.0002 
 
(0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0005) 
t3 -0.0000* -0.0000** -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 397.7923 102.8725 298.5596 
Log Likelihood -185.8961 -42.4362 -136.2798 
Deviance 371.7923 84.8725 272.5596 
Num. obs. 2680 654 2026 




Table 11: Regression Results SSC Without Post-Communist Countries 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.3408*** 0.8933*** 0.3127*** 
 
(0.0552) (0.3122) (0.0572) 
War -0.0658 -0.2579 -0.0437 
 
(0.1345) (0.3069) (0.1563) 
Democratization 0.1158 0.2094 0.1395 
 
(0.1429) (0.4768) (0.1530) 
t 0.0020 -0.0375 0.0106 
 
(0.0118) (0.0372) (0.0129) 
t2 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0004 
 
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
t3 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 811.9052 158.1392 658.1773 
Log Likelihood -392.9526 -70.0696 -316.0886 
Deviance 785.9052 140.1392 632.1773 
Num. obs. 4536 1411 3125 






Table 12: Regression Results PIT Without Post-Communist Countries 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.1479* 0.1828 0.1723* 
 
(0.0838) (0.2906) (0.0956) 
War 0.2576* 0.7321*** -0.0533 
 
(0.1552) (0.2639) (0.2337) 
Democratization -0.0636 -0.1586 -0.0609 
 
(0.2326) (0.5095) (0.2848) 
t -0.0024 0.0456 -0.0077 
 
(0.0167) (0.0562) (0.0197) 
t2 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0004 
 
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0004) 
t3 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 479.5105 146.3619 333.6856 
Log Likelihood -226.7552 -64.1810 -154.8428 
Deviance 453.5105 128.3619 309.6856 
Num. obs. 3516 1223 2293 




Table 13: Regression Results CIT Without Post-Communist Countries 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.3538*** 0.4604* 0.3270*** 
 
(0.0798) (0.2517) (0.0877) 
War -0.2037 -0.1418 -0.2378 
 
(0.1742) (0.2611) (0.2513) 
Democratization 0.2282 -0.2633 0.3168* 
 
(0.1613) (0.3986) (0.1895) 
t -0.0186 0.0484 -0.0254* 
 
(0.0133) (0.0482) (0.0154) 
t2 0.0005* -0.0005 0.0006** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000* 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 644.4038 171.3784 481.4040 
Log Likelihood -309.2019 -76.6892 -228.7020 
Deviance 618.4038 153.3784 457.4040 
Num. obs. 3810 1116 2694 




Table 14: Regression Results GST Without Post-Communist Countries 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization -0.0151 0.8037** -0.0396 
 
(0.0510) (0.3704) (0.0537) 
War 0.0509 1.3132*** -0.1431 
 
(0.1401) (0.3742) (0.1917) 
Democratization 0.0326 -0.3829 -0.0217 
 
(0.1340) (0.4192) (0.1542) 
t 0.0034 1.1417*** 0.0036 
 
(0.0125) (0.3440) (0.0137) 
t2 0.0001 -0.0271*** 0.0000 
 
(0.0003) (0.0082) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
AIC 924.8949 122.6117 761.0228 
Log Likelihood -449.4474 -52.3058 -367.5114 
Deviance 898.8949 104.6117 735.0228 
Num. obs. 4596 921 3675 




Table 15: Regression Results VAT Without Post-Communist Countries 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0326 -0.0670 0.0221 
 
(0.0489) (0.4143) (0.0512) 
War -0.4057* 28.3676 -0.3895* 
 
(0.2248) (1340.3502) (0.2259) 
Democratization 0.0625 -4.9144 0.1612 
 
(0.2978) (1901.5120) (0.3084) 
t 0.0523 0.9000*** 0.0399 
 
(0.0360) (0.3293) (0.0409) 
t2 0.0005 -0.0433*** 0.0011 
 
(0.0013) (0.0156) (0.0015) 
t3 -0.0000 0.0006*** -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
AIC 1076.1109 128.1544 945.4602 
Log Likelihood -525.0555 -55.0772 -459.7301 
Deviance 1050.1109 110.1544 919.4602 
Num. obs. 5149 415 4734 





Robustness II: Cox Models 
 
Table 16: Regression Results INH – Cox Model 
 
All Countries  OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.2188  -0.1754 0.2596 
 
(0.1922)  (1.3509) (0.2131) 
War 0.9953**  37.2951 0.9562** 
 
(0.3944)  (23684.7560) (0.4741) 
Democratization 0.4050  1.8074 0.5661 
 
(0.4533)  (1.8243) (0.5495) 
AIC 281.3417  35.7408 199.8575 
Num. obs. 3117  654 2463 
PH test 0.4711  0.0889 0.4191 




Table 17: Regression Results SSC – Cox Model 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.7124*** 1.8529** 0.6732*** 
 
(0.1214) (0.7437) (0.1256) 
War 0.1041 -0.3928 0.2318 
 
(0.2997) (0.8058) (0.3287) 
Democratization 0.3939 0.3334 0.3580 
 
(0.3209) (1.3716) (0.3378) 
AIC 646.6212 65.9704 512.5340 
Num. obs. 4748 1411 3337 
PH test 0.6319 0.4617 0.7533 




Table 18: Regression Results PIT – Cox Model 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.4014** 0.6580 0.4574** 
 
(0.1855) (0.7594) (0.2037) 
War 0.3236 1.6497** -0.3249 
 
(0.3218) (0.7809) (0.4247) 
Democratization 0.8123** -0.3326 0.5065 
 
(0.3429) (1.1789) (0.4405) 
AIC 426.2714 58.0280 294.3831 
Num. obs. 3789 1223 2566 
PH test 0.0000 0.5705 0.0025 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 




All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.7251*** 0.8281 0.7009*** 
 
(0.1700) (0.6231) (0.1902) 
War -0.5027 -0.8150 -0.3208 
 
(0.3702) (0.6988) (0.4835) 
Democratization 0.9029*** -1.0774 1.2837*** 
 
(0.3285) (1.1017) (0.4195) 
AIC 555.0556 69.1979 411.6530 
Num. obs. 4166 1116 3050 
PH test 0.1048 0.8453 0.2847 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
Table 20: Regression Results GST – Cox Model 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0248 1.7860** -0.0170 
 
(0.1156) (0.7930) (0.1221) 
War 0.2775 2.3482*** 0.0550 
 
(0.3000) (0.8792) (0.3758) 
Democratization 0.2286 -1.3470 0.2785 
 
(0.3036) (0.8780) (0.3463) 
AIC 860.8256 57.5276 704.9905 
Num. obs. 5166 921 4245 
PH test 0.1708 0.9873 0.5906 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
Table 21: Regression Results VAT – Cox Model 
 
 All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization  0.0589 -0.3687 0.0494 
 
 (0.1041) (0.8535) (0.1105) 
War  -0.5829 0.4632 -0.5660 
 
 (0.4710) (19346.5133) (0.4726) 
Democratization  1.5444*** -19.5763 1.7415*** 
 
 (0.3435) (15113.6921) (0.3929) 
AIC  1266.9885 73.9593 1102.8417 
Num. obs.  5380 415 4965 
PH test  0.0091 0.3484 0.0066 






Robustness III: War +/- 10 Years 
 







Table 22: Regression Results INH, War +/- 10 Years 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0488 -0.3312 0.0617 
 
(0.0745) (0.5537) (0.0787) 
War (+/-10 years) 0.2546* 0.9800** 0.2166 
 
(0.1436) (0.4171) (0.1689) 
Democratization 0.4458** 1.0208** 0.5432*** 
 
(0.1783) (0.4619) (0.2043) 
t -0.0294* -0.1189*** -0.0142 
 
(0.0160) (0.0447) (0.0206) 
t2 0.0007** 0.0025** 0.0004 
 
(0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0005) 
t3 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 433.8743 102.6536 331.5417 
Log Likelihood -203.9372 -42.3268 -152.7708 
Deviance 407.8743 84.6536 305.5417 
Num. obs. 3117 654 2463 




Table 23: Regression Results SSC, War +/- 10 Years 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.3361*** 0.8925*** 0.3106*** 
 
(0.0551) (0.3133) (0.0571) 
War (+/-10 years) -0.0837 -0.1075 -0.1194 
 
(0.1122) (0.2690) (0.1302) 
Democratization 0.1204 0.2008 0.1343 
 
(0.1370) (0.4774) (0.1463) 
t 0.0012 -0.0362 0.0089 
 
(0.0115) (0.0369) (0.0126) 
t2 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0003 
 
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
t3 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 850.9576 158.7486 695.9560 
Log Likelihood -412.4788 -70.3743 -334.9780 
Deviance 824.9576 140.7486 669.9560 
Num. obs. 4748 1411 3337 




Table 24: Regression Results PIT, War +/- 10 Years 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.1869** 0.1555 0.2028** 
 
(0.0759) (0.2880) (0.0861) 
War (+/-10 years) 0.1518 0.5512** -0.1924 
 
(0.1260) (0.2638) (0.1743) 
Democratization 0.4670*** -0.0715 0.3804** 
 
(0.1432) (0.4910) (0.1739) 
t -0.0343*** 0.0402 -0.0328** 
 
(0.0126) (0.0532) (0.0152) 
t2 0.0006*** -0.0007 0.0007** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 614.0098 149.7242 448.5255 
Log Likelihood -294.0049 -65.8621 -212.2627 
Deviance 588.0098 131.7242 424.5255 
Num. obs. 3789 1223 2566 




Table 25: Regression Results CIT, War +/- 10 Years 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.3412*** 0.4543* 0.3216*** 
 
(0.0755) (0.2566) (0.0828) 
War (+/-10 years) -0.0584 -0.0991 -0.0628 
 
(0.1276) (0.2512) (0.1637) 
Democratization 0.4449*** -0.2820 0.5135*** 
 
(0.1299) (0.3987) (0.1534) 
t -0.0327*** 0.0495 -0.0336** 
 
(0.0117) (0.0485) (0.0137) 
t2 0.0007*** -0.0005 0.0007** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 764.7719 171.5210 592.7181 
Log Likelihood -369.3859 -76.7605 -284.3591 
Deviance 738.7719 153.5210 568.7181 
Num. obs. 4166 1116 3050 




Table 26: Regression Results GST, War +/- 10 Years 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0118 0.9724** -0.0078 
 
(0.0498) (0.4032) (0.0518) 
War (+/-10 years) 0.1837* 1.4650*** 0.1197 
 
(0.1087) (0.4018) (0.1289) 
Democratization 0.1262 -0.1925 0.1098 
 
(0.1201) (0.4132) (0.1348) 
t -0.0002 0.8531*** 0.0004 
 
(0.0121) (0.3036) (0.0131) 
t2 0.0002 -0.0207*** 0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0075) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
AIC 998.2915 118.1861 836.1286 
Log Likelihood -486.1458 -50.0931 -405.0643 
Deviance 972.2915 100.1861 810.1286 
Num. obs. 5166 921 4245 




Table 27: Regression Results VAT, War +/- 10 Years 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0047 -0.0656 -0.0023 
 
(0.0488) (0.4141) (0.0511) 
War (+/-10 years) -0.3526** -3.0268 -0.3401** 
 
(0.1624) (575.4371) (0.1642) 
Democratization 0.7154*** -4.9132 0.7468*** 
 
(0.1602) (1901.8585) (0.1748) 
t -0.0243 0.8948*** -0.0411 
 
(0.0264) (0.3310) (0.0288) 
t2 0.0032*** -0.0431*** 0.0039*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0157) (0.0012) 
t3 -0.0000*** 0.0006*** -0.0001*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
AIC 1224.5873 128.1290 1091.0585 
Log Likelihood -599.2937 -55.0645 -532.5292 
Deviance 1198.5873 110.1290 1065.0585 
Num. obs. 5380 415 4965 





Robustness IV: Democratization +/- 10 Years 
 







Table 28: Regression Results INH, Democratization +/- 10 Years 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0093 -0.1972 0.0233 
 
(0.0688) (0.5370) (0.0730) 
War 0.4561*** 1.0067** 0.4299** 
 
(0.1511) (0.4394) (0.1765) 
Democratization (+/-10 years) 0.0367 0.1543 0.1647 
 
(0.1767) (0.4958) (0.2020) 
t -0.0375** -0.1174*** -0.0214 
 
(0.0152) (0.0438) (0.0198) 
t2 0.0008*** 0.0025** 0.0005 
 
(0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0005) 
t3 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 440.7670 106.4901 338.9650 
Log Likelihood -207.3835 -44.2450 -156.4825 
Deviance 414.7670 88.4901 312.9650 
Num. obs. 3332 654 2678 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
Table 29: Regression Results SSC, Democratization +/- 10 Years 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.2822*** 0.8648*** 0.2609*** 
 
(0.0462) (0.3154) (0.0472) 
War 0.0308 -0.2609 0.0767 
 
(0.1217) (0.3076) (0.1384) 
Democratization (+/-10 years) 0.1086 0.3076 0.0559 
 
(0.1136) (0.3101) (0.1273) 
t 0.0016 -0.0368 0.0082 
 
(0.0109) (0.0371) (0.0117) 
t2 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0003 
 
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
t3 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 904.7884 157.3434 749.3201 
Log Likelihood -439.3942 -69.6717 -361.6600 
Deviance 878.7884 139.3434 723.3201 
Num. obs. 4879 1411 3468 




Table 30: Regression Results PIT, Democratization +/- 10 Years 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.1202** 0.1860 0.1093* 
 
(0.0582) (0.2922) (0.0627) 
War 0.2241* 0.7283*** -0.0948 
 
(0.1336) (0.2646) (0.1802) 
Democratization (+/-10 years) 0.2341* -0.0706 0.1556 
 
(0.1306) (0.3674) (0.1575) 
t -0.0382*** 0.0459 -0.0392*** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0563) (0.0138) 
t2 0.0007*** -0.0007 0.0008*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 646.3561 146.4265 480.9420 
Log Likelihood -310.1781 -64.2133 -228.4710 
Deviance 620.3561 128.4265 456.9420 
Num. obs. 3957 1223 2734 




Table 31: Regression Results CIT, Democratization +/- 10 Years 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.2200*** 0.4596* 0.1906*** 
 
(0.0563) (0.2526) (0.0603) 
War -0.1612 -0.1595 -0.1809 
 
(0.1456) (0.2606) (0.1872) 
Democratization (+/-10 years) 0.1775 -0.0801 0.1668 
 
(0.1206) (0.2725) (0.1419) 
t -0.0403*** 0.0482 -0.0453*** 
 
(0.0111) (0.0482) (0.0126) 
t2 0.0008*** -0.0005 0.0009*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000*** 0.0000 -0.0000*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 808.6056 171.7731 636.0425 
Log Likelihood -391.3028 -76.8866 -306.0213 
Deviance 782.6056 153.7731 612.0425 
Num. obs. 4265 1116 3149 




Table 32: Regression Results GST, Democratization +/- 10 Years 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization -0.0165 0.7929** -0.0353 
 
(0.0468) (0.3627) (0.0485) 
War 0.1337 1.2623*** 0.0415 
 
(0.1249) (0.3619) (0.1544) 
Democratization (+/-10 years) 0.0392 -0.3410 0.0517 
 
(0.1076) (0.3521) (0.1199) 
t -0.0002 1.1468*** 0.0000 
 
(0.0116) (0.3461) (0.0124) 
t2 0.0002 -0.0272*** 0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0082) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
AIC 1013.4090 122.5355 849.7595 
Log Likelihood -493.7045 -52.2677 -411.8797 
Deviance 987.4090 104.5355 823.7595 
Num. obs. 5431 921 4510 




Table 33: Regression Results VAT, Democratization +/- 10 Years 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization -0.0053 -0.1489 -0.0107 
 
(0.0460) (0.4270) (0.0478) 
War -0.2488 28.7268 -0.2499 
 
(0.1903) (1337.1173) (0.1919) 
Democratization (+/-10 years) 0.5361*** -4.9407 0.5926*** 
 
(0.1365) (1302.9204) (0.1446) 
t -0.0482** 0.9366*** -0.0679*** 
 
(0.0245) (0.3384) (0.0261) 
t2 0.0040*** -0.0446*** 0.0049*** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0159) (0.0011) 
t3 -0.0001*** 0.0007*** -0.0001*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
AIC 1259.1555 127.0049 1122.7000 
Log Likelihood -616.5778 -54.5025 -548.3500 
Deviance 1233.1555 109.0049 1096.7000 
Num. obs. 5660 415 5245 




Robustness V: Inverse Distance to Democratization 
 





Table 34: Regression Results INH, Inverse Distance to Democratization 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0648 -0.3287 0.0789 
 
(0.0740) (0.5466) (0.0780) 
War 0.4442*** 1.0557** 0.4286** 
 
(0.1500) (0.4545) (0.1749) 
Democratization (Inv. Time) 0.3416 1.5258 0.5535 
 
(0.3927) (1.0300) (0.4190) 
t -0.0365** -0.1191*** -0.0198 
 
(0.0159) (0.0446) (0.0205) 
t2 0.0008** 0.0025** 0.0005 
 
(0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0005) 
t3 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 433.7332 105.1011 332.0066 
Log Likelihood -203.8666 -43.5505 -153.0033 
Deviance 407.7332 87.1011 306.0066 
Num. obs. 3117 654 2463 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
Table 35: Regression Results SSC, Inverse Distance to Democratization 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.3477*** 0.8578*** 0.3247*** 
 
(0.0551) (0.3180) (0.0569) 
War 0.0519 -0.2432 0.0992 
 
(0.1221) (0.3082) (0.1389) 
Democratization (Inv. Time) 0.3674 1.4759** 0.1440 
 
(0.2927) (0.6827) (0.3422) 
t 0.0019 -0.0420 0.0073 
 
(0.0116) (0.0380) (0.0125) 
t2 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0003 
 
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
t3 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 850.5127 154.4313 696.8290 
Log Likelihood -412.2563 -68.2157 -335.4145 
Deviance 824.5127 136.4313 670.8290 
Num. obs. 4748 1411 3337 




Table 36: Regression Results PIT, Inverse Distance to Democratization 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.1881** 0.1859 0.2196** 
 
(0.0749) (0.2914) (0.0853) 
War 0.2301* 0.7285*** -0.1156 
 
(0.1345) (0.2635) (0.1844) 
Democratization (Inv. Time) 0.8978*** -0.3015 0.7865** 
 
(0.2747) (1.1750) (0.3292) 
t -0.0355*** 0.0457 -0.0348** 
 
(0.0125) (0.0563) (0.0148) 
t2 0.0007*** -0.0007 0.0008*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 612.5767 146.3970 448.9133 
Log Likelihood -293.2883 -64.1985 -212.4567 
Deviance 586.5767 128.3970 424.9133 
Num. obs. 3789 1223 2566 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
Table 37: Regression Results CIT, Inverse Distance to Democratization 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.3323*** 0.4596* 0.3050*** 
 
(0.0737) (0.2515) (0.0793) 
War -0.1313 -0.1515 -0.1327 
 
(0.1485) (0.2609) (0.1927) 
Democratization (Inv. Time) 0.7572*** -0.5910 0.7491** 
 
(0.2657) (1.0854) (0.3041) 
t -0.0372*** 0.0492 -0.0414*** 
 
(0.0116) (0.0484) (0.0135) 
t2 0.0008*** -0.0005 0.0008*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000*** 0.0000 -0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 768.1521 171.5154 597.5676 
Log Likelihood -371.0760 -76.7577 -286.7838 
Deviance 742.1521 153.5154 573.5676 
Num. obs. 4166 1116 3050 




Table 38: Regression Results GST, Inverse Distance to Democratization 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0012 0.7447** -0.0186 
 
(0.0493) (0.3645) (0.0514) 
War 0.1205 1.2205*** 0.0336 
 
(0.1249) (0.3603) (0.1542) 
Democratization (Inv. Time) 0.2333 0.2493 0.1335 
 
(0.2786) (0.8625) (0.3232) 
t 0.0005 1.0985*** -0.0005 
 
(0.0119) (0.3414) (0.0130) 
t2 0.0002 -0.0256*** 0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0080) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
AIC 1000.6002 123.4057 837.4326 
Log Likelihood -487.3001 -52.7028 -405.7163 
Deviance 974.6002 105.4057 811.4326 
Num. obs. 5166 921 4245 




Table 39: Regression Results VAT, Inverse Distance to Democratization 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0163 -0.1172 0.0084 
 
(0.0484) (0.4318) (0.0506) 
War -0.2807 27.9036 -0.2745 
 
(0.1926) (1339.5181) (0.1940) 
Democratization (Inv. Time) 1.4597*** -4.1055 1.4817*** 
 
(0.2806) (5.1228) (0.2965) 
t -0.0238 0.8959*** -0.0426 
 
(0.0262) (0.3297) (0.0283) 
t2 0.0032*** -0.0429*** 0.0039*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0156) (0.0012) 
t3 -0.0000*** 0.0006*** -0.0001*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
AIC 1224.3337 128.4651 1090.7786 
Log Likelihood -599.1669 -55.2325 -532.3893 
Deviance 1198.3337 110.4651 1064.7786 
Num. obs. 5380 415 4965 




Robustness VI: No Region Fixed Effects 
 






Table 40: Regression Results INH, No Region Fixed Effects 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0585 -0.5052 0.0770 
 
(0.0666) (0.5019) (0.0688) 
War 0.3203** 0.6865* 0.2862* 
 
(0.1457) (0.3589) (0.1675) 
Democratization 0.3669** 0.9056** 0.3620* 
 
(0.1733) (0.4481) (0.1950) 
t -0.0381** -0.1068** -0.0244 
 
(0.0152) (0.0432) (0.0191) 
t2 0.0009*** 0.0024** 0.0005 
 
(0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0004) 
t3 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 437.6559 102.0411 341.9909 
Log Likelihood -211.8280 -44.0206 -163.9955 
Deviance 423.6559 88.0411 327.9909 
Num. obs. 3117 654 2463 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
Table 41: Regression Results SSC, No Region Fixed Effects 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.2421*** 0.4798* 0.2609*** 
 
(0.0512) (0.2536) (0.0509) 
War -0.0604 -0.2099 -0.0016 
 
(0.1177) (0.2836) (0.1324) 
Democratization 0.1758 -0.0845 0.1444 
 
(0.1332) (0.4679) (0.1455) 
t -0.0077 -0.0439 0.0023 
 
(0.0109) (0.0348) (0.0121) 
t2 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0003 
 
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
t3 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 884.6203 164.1682 710.0323 
Log Likelihood -435.3102 -75.0841 -348.0162 
Deviance 870.6203 150.1682 696.0323 
Num. obs. 4748 1411 3337 




Table 42: Regression Results PIT, No Region Fixed Effects 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.0781 -0.0017 0.0946 
 
(0.0613) (0.2627) (0.0614) 
War 0.2052 0.6252** 0.0815 
 
(0.1269) (0.2449) (0.1596) 
Democratization 0.4403*** -0.1579 0.4430*** 
 
(0.1388) (0.5003) (0.1569) 
t -0.0415*** 0.0257 -0.0494*** 
 
(0.0117) (0.0421) (0.0134) 
t2 0.0008*** -0.0005 0.0010*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000*** 0.0000 -0.0000*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 616.6082 147.2536 465.3556 
Log Likelihood -301.3041 -66.6268 -225.6778 
Deviance 602.6082 133.2536 451.3556 
Num. obs. 3789 1223 2566 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
Table 43: Regression Results CIT, No Region Fixed Effects 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.2162*** 0.4014* 0.2277*** 
 
(0.0635) (0.2253) (0.0706) 
War -0.2228 -0.1091 -0.2429 
 
(0.1413) (0.2575) (0.1842) 
Democratization 0.5002*** -0.2664 0.5970*** 
 
(0.1266) (0.4000) (0.1478) 
t -0.0313*** 0.0518 -0.0323** 
 
(0.0114) (0.0481) (0.0132) 
t2 0.0006*** -0.0006 0.0006** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000* 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 765.2834 168.3999 592.1961 
Log Likelihood -375.6417 -77.2000 -289.0980 
Deviance 751.2834 154.3999 578.1961 
Num. obs. 4166 1116 3050 




Table 44: Regression Results GST, No Region Fixed Effects 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization -0.0934** 0.2399 -0.1116** 
 
(0.0424) (0.2178) (0.0454) 
War -0.0228 0.2965 -0.1408 
 
(0.1146) (0.2315) (0.1452) 
Democratization 0.1747 0.2383 0.1306 
 
(0.1163) (0.3173) (0.1300) 
t -0.0012 0.1094 -0.0049 
 
(0.0115) (0.0703) (0.0126) 
t2 0.0002 -0.0015 0.0002 
 
(0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0003) 
t3 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
AIC 1020.5868 156.4269 859.8566 
Log Likelihood -503.2934 -71.2135 -422.9283 
Deviance 1006.5868 142.4269 845.8566 
Num. obs. 5166 921 4245 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
Table 45: Regression Results VAT, No Region Fixed Effects 
 
All Countries OECD 18 RoW 
Modernization 0.1035*** 0.0898 0.0876*** 
 
(0.0305) (0.3699) (0.0331) 
War -0.4098** -4.2597 -0.3780** 
 
(0.1778) (318.6247) (0.1801) 
Democratization 0.5947*** -4.1135 0.6328*** 
 
(0.1490) (459.1538) (0.1596) 
t -0.0371 0.2151** -0.0560** 
 
(0.0254) (0.1090) (0.0276) 
t2 0.0033*** -0.0067 0.0042*** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0044) (0.0011) 
t3 -0.0000*** 0.0001 -0.0001*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
AIC 1276.2737 140.7871 1130.3986 
Log Likelihood -631.1369 -63.3936 -558.1993 
Deviance 1262.2737 126.7871 1116.3986 
Num. obs. 5380 415 4965 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
